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THE FEDER.-\L TRAD8.1ARK DILli1l0N ACT:
POlENT WEAPON OR UPHILL BATILE

Erin J. Roth· Georgetown University Law Center
and
Roben B. Bennett, Jr." Butkr Uni ....ersity

INTRODUCTION
With the enactment of the "Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ,"1 (the "FmA") on
January 16, 1996, the legal community proclaimed that a new era in U.S. trademark law
had begun.' Before its enacttnent, U.S. trademark owners were entitled to legal rdief
W\der the Lanham ACf only if owners couJd prove unauthorized, subsequent use of a
same or similar mark that "..as likely confuse the public concerning: the sourt:e of the .
goods or services in question, or the sponsorship, affiliation or approval by the senior
mark holder of such junior use.~ Dilution protected a trademark o\\ner directly against
the diminution of a trademark's commercial value by an unauthorized use of a same or
substantially similar mark, without the need to prove a likelihood of confusion. With the
passing of the FTDA. dilution is now federally protected.s However, despite the initial
scholarly elation at the passage of the FTDA, the Act has proved to be less effective than
the legal community had initially hoped, The FTDA has been ineffective in completely
protecting famow marks as was its intent, The reasons include: the absence of a
definition of ~di l ution." its lack of a reconciliation with the Lanham Act's definition of
trademarlc protection, the 'weak application of the "famous mark" standards, and the
improper use of tests to determine the existence of dilution.
Following a brief discussion of the history of trademark infringement law, the e\'Cllts
leading to the FTDA, and an overview of the FTDA, this paper discusses the major
causes or the F'rDA's ineffectiveness, We ....ill then re\iew the application of the act,
discuss its implications on the future of trademark ownership in business, and suggest
improvements to the legal application of the act,

WHAT IS DILUTION?
The theory of the dilution of trademarks was discussed in a seminal article by Frank
Schechter in 1921, nearly twenty years before the adoption of the Lanham Act gO\"CrWng
the registration and protection of trademarks.' While Schechter did nOt expressly use the
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tenn "dilution," he did discuss the concept that has become the definition of dilution
accepted by most scholars today. Schechter proposed to protect trademark o",ners from
the "whinling away or dispersion of the identifY and,hold upon the public mind of the
mark...T Today, this concept has evolved even fwther to embrace protecting a trademark' s
"commercial magnetism" or selling power against unauthorized use by another party,
especially in protecting very famous, or weU-known maries.'
Unlike trademark infringement, dilution does not rely upon the "likelihood of confusion"
to impose an injunction against a j unior user of a mark. While the concept of dilution
seems very simple to grasp, applying the theory in practi"t:al situations has proved
troublesome. 9 Much of the difficulty in applyinll the theory has risen out of the natural
conflict betv,'een the traditional pwpose of trademark law, and the dJ.~ution concept.
Briefly, dilution, protects a mark nomithstanding the absence of a likelihood of confusion,
as the mark is seen as property which deserves protection. Dilution confers a propertylike right upon the trademark holder, entitling the holder to maintain the mark against
uses that, although are not confusing;, rna)' over a period oftime diffuse the po""~r of the
mark to distinctively identify itself commercially, This cause of action gives the
trademark: owner an absolute property right in the trademark, and its violation is similar
to
to the policy involved in the ton of appropriation.
The to rt of appropriation is the use of one person's name or likeness by another, without
pennission and for the benefit of the user, In Carson v. Here:rJohnny Portable Toil~IS,1 1
a Mich.igan corporation ad\'ertised its rentable toilets as " Here' s Johnny" toilets. Johnny
Carson, famous latto-night talk show host, brought suit claiming that the Michigan
corporation had \iolated his right to privacy by publicly appropriating his celebrity $WUS
for the corpocation's commercial benefil,1l The court ~ld that the use ~r " H~' s
Johnny" was an appropriation because the phrase was so strongly associated WIlli
Carson' s public personality.

In contrast, traditional trademark law protects a manufacturer's trademark from
competitor's using the same mark on different but competing goods, thereby dishonestly
profiting for the manufacturer's reputation for quality ll00ds, Infringement is sho....ll by
proving a likelihood of consumer COnfusiOlL B Such confusion is shown by the fact that
the use of an infringing mark is li.k.t:ly to mislead a substantial number of potential
customers as to the manufacturer of a particular good. I. As trademark infringement
requires a finding that consumers are being misled, it bas its basis in the tort of fraudulent
misrepresentation or deceit- IS The trademark holder may. only protect. the .trademz:rt
when such protection is beneficial to conswners by enabling them to Idenufy quality
goods or services from an infringing mark of!mo."er quality. Therefore, a trademark holder
or o\WCr holds only a limited right in his mark. He may only protect his mark when
such protection is beneficial to an individua1 relying on the conect recognition of his
mark.. He cannot protect the mark. itself. simply to maintain its own value to the owner,
Jior example.Jn Vuitlon et Fils, $.A. Y. CrOl+71 Handbags,16 the court granted Vuitton, a
manufacturer ofluxuty handbags, pennanent injunctive relief from Cro\VJl Handbag's lISle
of a mark similar to that which Vuitton used on its handbags, Vuinon et Fils is a
manufacturer of high quality handbags bearing the Vuitton registered trademark, the fum's
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~ni~a~ and a "f1eur-~e-lis. ~ Cro"'ll handbags was not a Vuinon retail ourlel, but sold
tmltatlonS of the Vwnon hand.~, . A~ the trial, the imitation Crown handbags were
sh~\Vfl ~ be cheap, !ow quality lIIlltatlons of Vuitlon's product. Such use \'iolated
Vwnon s trademark nghts, Judge Brieant stated:
When an alleged infringing mark is used in connection with the sale of similar
~OOds. the long standing rule ...has been, thai the second comer 10 the marketplace
has a duty to so name and dress hIS product as to a\'oid all likelihood of
consumers confusing it with the product of the first comer ' ~ 1l
Simil~IY,. all trade~~ infringement cases ~Iy upon the likelihood' of confusion to prove
that a JUDJor mark Infiinges upon the distinct nature of the senior mack.
To~y, .dilution theory has further evolved, Current dilution theory recognizes the theory
of dil,ut,on ~ presented by Schechter. embracing the notion that dilution protects a mark
norwl1hstand~ the absence of ,a. l.ikeli hood of confusion. Howcver, this theory has
broadened to Include mas not Imtlally recognized as a part of dilution bv Schechter,
~~~r, CUJTent c~ on di~u~o~ have distinguished two distinct types of dilution cases:
dilutl~n by' blumnll and ddutl~n ~y tamishment.~ ~Di1ution by blurring" is defined
as the connnuous use of a mark sunilar to a plaintiff's mark that wories an adverse effeci
upon the di.stinctive~ss of ~ p~~£rs mark whereby, if the plaintiff is unable to stop
h use, hiS mark W1~ I~e ~ts dlstmctive quality entirely. nil "Dilution by tantishment"
stnves to prevent the dUDJnubon of the posith'C associations a holder has labored to create
through his advertising and promotion. The tamishrnent theory holds the notion that a
trademark represents the reputation and goodwill of the holde r and any unauthorized use
of ~e mark, make that reputation and goodwill susceptibl~ to inj~, Dilution by
t~shment IS considered to OCCur in 1:\1.'0 ways: (I) the unauthorized j unior use of a
~~or holder's mark on goods or services of inferior quality and (2) by the unauthorized
Juntor use of a senior bolder's mark in an Wlwholesome context1t

slI7

~ilu~11 received very little attention Wltil 1933 when the dilution theory first appeared
m a New York court. In the ~ of Tiffany & CO. Y. Tiffany Produclions, 1'J the New
Yor~ Supreme C~un granted re.lief to the famous Tiffany jewelers against the defendant
mo~~ theal~r which used the Tiffany name in association with adul t entertainment The
plaintiff claimed that suc:b use would di minish and tarnish the reputation of Tiffany &
C~.• a fB:mous, m~dlser of ~nsive jewelry. Atthough the court found that there
~sted little I~~I~ of confuslon, since the two parties "'"ere not competing services,
n granted the lD,junctlon to protect the reputation of the jeweler,21 The coun considered
the matter under New York inhingement law because a'dilution statute did not then exist
under ~ew YO,rk law. Ho~ever, the court used dilution tenninolog:y, instead of the
confusion temunology associated "'ith trademark infringement, to justify its decision.
Once again, ho....~\'C~, little was heard concerning trademark dilution until 1946. General
fear.of.monopoh.zauo~ oftradem~, and the misunderstandinll and misinterpretation
of diluuon theory kept II from becommg a provision in the original version of the Lanham
AC1,21 Ho....'Cver. the follo",ing year, the first state anti-dilution measure was passed in
Massa~h~~.21 Subsequently, other concerns surrounding the power and scope of a
potential dduuon statute kept it from becoming pan of federal legislation until J995 ,l.
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While the f~dcral govcmm~nt was reluctant to adopt the dilution theory, over half of the
states adopted dilution stannes or included dilution theory in their common laW.2' The
International Trademark Association OT A) even urged states to adopt a model trademark
dilution bill.~ Most state 18....'$ foll ow the ITA model and provide injunctive relief on a
finding of likelihood of dilution. However, Wltil th~ late 19705, courts were reluctant to
apply dilution principles despite their authority to do so from their respective
legislarurcs- 21

in suppan of federa l trademark protection stated:
When the rights which we try to enforce arc not clearly stated, we must
either commit ourselves to expensive, protracted and uncertain litigation
or fail to act in defense of our brands. Such cases represent a financial
loss for the trademark owner and a loss of efficiency for the judicial
system "'ruch could be remedied by legislative adoption of dilution as a
basis for the protection of famous trademarks. ;1

In 19n, the New York Court of Appeals brought dilution into the mainstream of
trademark protection in Allied Maimenanc.e Corp. v. Allied"Mecnanical Tradel, Inc.lI

Increasing recogni tion of and support for a dilution provision at a national level, spWTed
the owners of famous trademarks to push for a dilution debate outside the academic arena.
With growi ng restlessness for greater national protection than that which the Lanham Act
offered: the federal gO\'CnUDC1lt began to take serious action towards nationalizing dilution
protectlon.

Although the court in Allied Maintenance did not find dilution, it provided a judicial
definition of dilution that was consistent willi. Schechter's original analys1\. The decision
stated that dilution 'was not confusion, as was the case with trademark infringement. It
was, instead. a "cancer-like gro....1h of dissimilar products or services which feed upon the
business reputation of an established distinctive trademark "19 Because Allied was not a
distinct mark, the court found no dilution. It stated that this case "erected one of the most
fonnidable barriers to dilution relief: the requirement that the plaintiffs mark be
somehow famous. .. )0 Thus, the court limited such dilution protection to those marks that
were sufficiently distinctive.
Despite its impact, the Allied Maintenance case did not prove to be the catalyst for a
boom in dilution case filings as some had expected. ll In dilution cases reported in
Federal Courts since 1917, only forty-three considered dilution as more than a boilerplate
issue . Only ten cases resulted in an injunction based on dilution in part, while only four
cases based their entire rationale on dilution.32 The Restatement on Unfair Competition
reiterates the view that while courts were reluctant to utilize the: dilution rationale before
Allied MainfeMllce, there had been a general acceptance of the theory in the years since
even though its application by legal commWlity bad been sparse. However, the
Restatement cautions that courts continue to confine the cause of action for dilution to
cases in which die protectable interest is clear.» Courts were more willing to use dilution
as a complement to traditional trademark cases than to create a broad dilution cause of
action.
As a result, state remedies, and the willingness of each court system to issue injunctive
relief, varied. encoutaging forum shopping.)! Ironically, under all relevant state law, the
tv.'O essential elements of a trademark dilution claim are the same: the senior holder must
possess a distinctive trademark, and there must be a likelihood of dilution.:» Most states
that had adopted the dilution doctrine are in agreement on tv.'o crucial points, at least in
theory: trademarlc dilution can occur regardless of the lack of a likelihood of confusion
and despite the absence of competition between parties.loII

H1STOR Y OF TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT LAW
\\!hen ~he Lanham Act was adopted in 1946, providing fo r the federal registration and
protectIon of trademarks, no state had previously adopted trademarlc laws. While the idea
of trademarks, as well as dilution, had been around in academic circ les for some nwnber
of )'ears, the economic fear of mooopolies had delayed the adoption of the Lanham Act
or similar trademark protection legislation.lII The Senate committee on Patents in
recommending the passage of the Lanham Act. assured Senate that it would no t "fo:mr
hateful monopolies.'>«1 The major apprehension lay in the belief that a trademark would
allow one producer to essentially comer a product market. U After the holder's mark
became synonymous with the product, one could raise market entl}' barriers preventing
additional competition for that product 4) It was largely because of this overwhclrning
fear of monopoly that the Lanham Act was ",ritten as it was, initially ignoring the idea
of dilution.
From the outset, the Act sought to protect the public from deceit and swindling. It also
sought to promote fair 'Competition. OJ These goals W'Cl'C consistent with the roolS of
tra~mark law in fraud and deceit. Likewise, these goals addressed the monopolistic fears
vOiced by opponentS of the Lanham Act" Trademark law, therefore, did not evolve as
the protector of an ownership interest in a mark. Instead, its aim was to establish a real
relationship between the tradmaarlc and the ttademark holder.

Yet, even in sean:hing for the most favorable outcome, plaintiffs were often swprised at
the difficulty they faced in obtaining a ~y, Only half of the states had dilution laws
bv 1995' therefore many sWC courts were hesitant to grant a nation ....ide injunction as
remed~.. as-nati~al enforcement of the injunction seemed impossible.J • Holders of
famous marks increasingly pushed for national dilution protection hoping to gain national
protection for their marks. The Assistant Generai Counst:1 for Campbell Soup Company,

The baLance of the above mentioned goals 'WaS addressed in the language of the Lanham
Act which required the proof of the likelihood of confusion. As it was designed, the
Lanham Act protected a trademarlc holder against unauthorized, subsequent use of the
same or similar mark that was likely to result in public confusion concerning the source
of ~e goods or services in question, or the sponsorship, affiJiation or approval by the
~o~ m~ bolder to s uch junior usc. 4J The likelihood of confusion requirement placed
a limltatlon on the trademark holder and the exclusive right to use the mark. Before
~~i sing the excl~vity of one '.s mark, o~ would have to demonsuate that, through a
likelihood of CO~IOn, the public was bemg harmed. &6 Therefore, the exclusive right,
or the monopoly nght, could only be exercised when it was in the interest of the public
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if

to prevent fraud and deceit. This limitation furthered the current and historical g~ls of

of intending to protect the public, it "focuses on the investment the owner has made in
the mark.'o6O

trademark regulatIOn while counterbalancing fears about the condlltt of monopolies.
Howe\'er, dilution statues do not require likelihood of confusion. The harm that th~
dilution statutes seek to prevent are not harms to the public, but ramer, harms to the
trademark bolder because the distinctive quality of the mark is impaired. Clearly, then,
the principles underl)ing the state dilution statutes seem to diverge from the intent of the
Congress when it enacted the Lanham Act.~1 In light of this divergence from trademark
law, ",'hy would Congress enact a federal dilution statute as an amendment to the Lanham
•
Act?

'f!1e ~port also acknowledged the inconsistency among the states in the area of tmdemark
diluhon. The federal provision was lntended to "establish a nationwide floor for
~ot~ction against dilution.»61 The Senate report noted that although many stales had
diluaon statutes, the court decisions interpreting these statues were inconsistent and
therefore, "combined with the n~er of states that [did] not have dilution laws, (created]
a patc~r~.type o~ ~tection.
The Senate report further noted that passage of a
fede:aJ d ilUtlo~ proVIsion would help the United States in the negotiations conceming the
foreIgn prot~tlon of U.S. trademarks abroad as part afme General Agreement on Tariffs
and Tr:ade (GATT) process, 8S many "GATT nations" already possessed dilution
protectIOn. 6.l

There exists another Congressional purpose lhat academic circles and at Teast one district
court have found persuasive.~ J Arguably, Congress intended to ~eve national
Wlifonnity in trademark la",'5 via the Lanham Act. 49 The Senate Comrruttee. on Patents
suggested that one of the attractions of a federal trademark statute was that If the stales
....'()Uld change the law with respect to trademarks, that there would be "as many different
varieties of common law as there are states."'" Citing gro....th in interstate trade, the
Committee on Patents stated that it would be unwise for trademark rights to vary from
state to state.'1 The Committee urged that national registration was needed to "secure to
the owners of trademarks in interstate commerce defInite rights ." ~

~urther, the bill was not intended to ~mpt state regulation to the extent that, at that
tun~ , such provisions provided greater protection than did the federal starute. 64 It was
deSIgned, like the original Lanham Act, to provide a nationwide minimum level of
dilution protection.

When the bill was introduced into the House, however, it "''as met \~;th Constitutional
concerns related to the First Amendment." The concerns dealt with the freedom of
com~tive speech and parody and this provision's possible effects upon the continued
protecnon of these two types of speech. Concerns that this provision would, in effect,
make such fonns of speech virtually illegal, led to the removal of the antidilution
pro\-ision from the bill that would eventually become the Trademark Revision Act.66

Section 45 of the Lanham Act supports the uniformity argwnent which supports the
notion of federal protection of marks. Over the seven and a half years ~ the ~ct
debated, few issues were debated more often than the inclusion of a natlonai ~omllty
clause. Congress expressed the goal .....to protect registered trademarks used m such
(interstate) commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation."" EventualJy,
this Statement was included, suggesting the overwhelming intent of the Act to encourage
federal, not slate, regulation of tradema.rks.

"':as

The legislatiye histOry surrounding the Trademark Revision Act laid the groundwork for
future attempts at the adoption of federal anti·dilution measures. Both houses of Congress
DOW spoke approvingly of the protection of the trademark holder's interest in the mark. 61
The shift from a limited right to an absolute right in the mark reflects Schechter's thesis'
the
itself, is something to be protected for its own value. Given the apparen~
lesserung of the concern over monopolization, and the new intent of the legislation to
protect the trademark bolde r's investment, the likelihood of confusion test became
superlluous.

From the 1946 legislative history, it is easy to demonstrate an inconsistency between ~c
Congressional intention behind the Lanham Act which focused on c.onsumer protecnon
and the intent of state dilution statutes which focused on protectlon of the o",ne~ ,
investment in the mark. However, the legislath'e history of the Act does not end m
31
1946,'"' In 1988, Congress passed the Trademark Revision Act. \VhiIe the Trademark
Re\i sion Act, itself, is of little interest when discussing trademark dilution starute:s, the
legislative history illustrates the shift in emphasis from exclusiye conswner protectIon to
include protection of the mark holder since the passage of the Lanham Act.

m:u-k.

J?le .new intent of the dilution doctrine involved providing a federal foundation of a
dilutlon law upon which the states could build greater protections. This new intent,
combined with the diminishment of both the fear of monopolies and the lack of need for
the likelihood of confusion standard, laid the ground work for the next significant attempt:
at establishing a federal dilution statute, The FedenrJ Trademark: Dilution Act of 1995.

Although, the Senate approved an anti-dilution pro\-;si~n within ~e ~ rademark Revuioo
Act. which would provide a federal cause of action for dilutIOn, ~e Ho~ of
Representatives struck that provision. ~ The Senate report that accomparued the bill to
the House stated that the federal antidilution provision had the narrow pwpose of
protecting truly famous registered tradema.rks.n The anti-diluti~ provisio.n made clear
pt i ts~ pe~k was not the likelihood of confusion, decepn?", or ~stake by ~
pUblic.JI Instead, the statute protects the trademark's owner. ~amst actl~ by a ~
party that "destroy the public'S perception that the mark SIgnifies something ~que,
singular or particular.''" The accompanying Senate report goes on to state thai lIlStud

THE BIRTH OF THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DlLlJTION ACT OF 1995
Follo....ing the failure to include a dilution provision within the 1988 Trademark: Revision
~ct, .mark holders continued to rely on developing state law to protect against trademark
diluaon. HO"''ever, the variety of problems associated with state dilution la",'5 were once
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again brought to the forefront. Most notable among the many problems was the difficulty

of obtaining a remedy.

1be onl)' remedy available under most State laws was an

injunction preventing the use afthe diluting mark.6I However, as previously mentioned,
some state courts were reluctant to gram national injunctions for •..iolation of state dilution

application of dilution statutes, Mead Data might not ha\'e been upheld in the remaining
states which did have dilution lav..'S.1l Still another argument against imposing state
injunctions on a national basis coocems the constitutionality of extraterritorial
injunctions. ' )

iav.'S because of the difficulty of enforcement. Consequently, the scope of an injunction
became a primary issue in the debate over federal dilution protection. If an injunction
was ismed oniy for the jurisdiction granting the injunction, the unauthorized use of the
mark could continue in any other state, evenrually spilling over into the jurisdiction in
....tuch the injunClion was originally granted. Con\'crsely, if. nationv.ide injunction "'"8S
granted, the legal basis for applying the injunction in state'! without dilution laws was
sus~ct. &9

As time w~nt on, it became incrcas~n~ly ~pa!ent that ~s ~tch\\. ork system

of dilution law ....'as madequate 10 protect dlStmctlve marks which '"'Were, almost by
definition., nationally recognized and required a nationwide injunction.
Second, many state dilution statutes struggled to define the varying degrees of made
disrincth'COCss. Courts Struggled to draw a line beN,een those marks distinctive enough
to be diluted and those marks that were nol so distincti ....e. The problem with dilution in
this respect is that the dilution concept was a prediction of the effects of impairment
resulting from a secondary use over time, making the future value of a mark to holders
almost impossible to quantify.1O
Third, anti..cJilution la","'5 were often susceptible to improper judicial application.. in most
cases, dilution as a state claim was pleaded as a boilerplate supplement to the Lanham
Act trademark infringement claims. 7L Consequently, many rulings on dilution were by
Federal Courts applying a state's law based on pendant jurisdiction.71 These results led
to questionable precedemi.al value of any dilution rationale at all. Many courts implied
a confusion standard similar to traditional trademark law in order to find dilution.13
These major problems with state anti-dilution statutes arc best demonstrated in Mead Dolo
Central. Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales. US.A. Inc.?' Mead, the provider of LEXJS legal
research services, brought a suit 10 enjoin Toyota Motor Sales from marketing a luxury
automobile using the name LEXUS.7J Utilizing the New York anti-dil ution statute, Mead
claimed that the name LEXUS would dilute the LEXIS mark for legal services." The
lrial coun held that the name LEXUS was likely to dilute the LEXlS mark. without
finding a likelihood of confusion." The Second Circuit reyersed the decision, ho .....evtr.
stating that the LEXIS mark was not likely to be diluted because it was only recognizable
and distinctive to the legal community, not the general public." The court of appeals
.stated that the senior mark needed to be distinctive to the general public to qualify fOT
dilution protection.1'9
In the Mead DaJa case, the trial courtS granted the plaintiffs a nationwide injtmCtion based
on New York's dilution statute.1Il Enjoining the LEXUS mark on any basis other less
than a national one would hayc rendered the injunction virtually useless. However, a
state dilution statute could not provide a sufficiently strong legal basis to support a
- nationWiaeinjunction.'L If a natiom..ide injunction had been upheld using New York's
law, Toyota Motor Sales would have been penalized for engaging in an activity that was
legal in half of the United States. Also, because of the inconsistency of the judicial
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Mead Data also accentuated the problems with the varying definitions of distinctiveness.
In Mead Data, both the trial conn and the conn of appeals relied on the Nev.' York
dilution statue language to determine whether the LEXIS mark was distinctive, but their
analyses relUlted in two different decisions. Holding that the LEXlS mark was
distinctive, the trial court detennined that the proper test for distinctiveness was ''whether
the malk [could] distinguish its product from others and [was] uniquely associated ....ith
the source of the product.'014 The Court of Appeals considered other factors in arriving
at its decision that the LEXIS mark was not distinctive: (I) The strength of the mark and,
(2) whether the mark had a distinctive quality to the general public.1S The Mead Data
cases reflected the Mdichotomy [that developed) between those courts stressing and those .
deprecating strong distinctiveness as a sine qua non for protectability against dilution. ~Ifi
Some courts emphasized the mark's uruqueness, arbitrariness, fame and celebrity while
others supported the position that if a mark serves as an identifier and, in fact, identifies
a product to consumers, it is distinctive enough to qualify for protection from dilutiOn..' 1
Further, courts have found a variety of marks to be "distinctive ;~ whi le some of the
marks determined 10 be ~distinctive" are natwnally known," many others are not."
Analyzing decisions such as Mead Data also accentuates problems associated with the
improper judicial application of the dilution definition within and between state courts.
F?r instance, the Second Circuit in Mead Dato considered whether the avemge consumer
v..:ould find .LEXIS and LEXUS confusingly similar, though dilution theory expressly
dl~s.ukelihood of confusion in its analysis. 90 The federal court, applying the New
York dilution statute, stated that prior Nev.' York decisions that granted reliefin a dilution
claim required a finding of "confusion, fraud, lor] deception:"1 Thus, this coun felt that
a likelihood of confusion should be a factor in dilution analysis, even though a likelihood
of confusion is not expressly required by the New York statute.v.! Fwther, even though
the New York. and Riinois dilution statues are identical, decisions in their respective
courts often differed suhstantially.9J For example, Illinois courts often refused to find
dilution if no confusion existed, while New York courts often found dilulion only in the
presence of confusion.!I<

F~er, while not expressly discussed in Mead Dala, the issue of the application of
dilutIOn statutes to non-competing goods has been disputed by the COutts and scholars .
Scholan ~ve argued whether the definition of "dilution" includes a need for parties to
be .com~tors ..Sc~lars have noted that "there is... nothing in the statutes which suggest
or Implies that dilunon should be limited to._where the parties 8rC_.related-..the Statutory
language strongly implies that the proximity between the parties' goods or services is
irrelevant to a finding of dilution.~ HO","'C\'er, the New York court interpreted New
York's dilution statute as requiring the plaintiff and defendant to be in related
businesses," even though the New York starute expressly states that dilution can be found
even in the absence of competition between the panics." Finally, state courts had also
inteTpreted the definition of "di lution" to include the necessity for wrongful intent on the
9

part of the defendant, despite the lack a wrongful intent requirement in any state dilution
stalute."
As a result of such state inconsistencies, Rep. Carlos Morehead (R-Ca.) introduced the
FTDA before the House of Rc:presenlalives in March, 1995.911 Backed strongly by the
International Trademark Association (INTA), the .<\merican Bar Association (ABA), the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the United Sates Trademark Association
(UST A) and bipartisan support, this federal dilution proposal was approved 100 The House
passed the FTDA on December 12, 1995 and the Senate did the same on December 29,
1995. 1G1 On January 16, 1996, President Clinton signed thelfTDA 1«! into law.l );
The FTDA is similar 10 the dilution provision the USTA attempted 10 incftlde in the 19811
Trademark Revision Act. Like the USTA provision, the purpose of the FTDA is to
"protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blm the distinctiveness of the JIUIJ'k
or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion.,,1(10 It attemptS
to accomplish this purpose by adding an amendment to the Lanham Act allowing legal
action to be taken when the unauthorized use of a famous mark "causes dilution to the
distinctive qualiry of the mark- nlln n.e federal statute was deemed "necessary becaUSt
famous marks ordinarily are used on a nationwide basis and dilution protection is
currently oniy available on a patch--quilt system of protection.,, 106 Tbe House report on
the proposed bill abo stated that the federal remedy would "bring I.mjJormity and
consistencY to the protection offamous marks," I07 lessening fOTUIra.shopping and reducing
litigation ~sary to proteCt famous marks. le • Testifying before the House Comminte
on the Judiciary in further support of the FTDA, the Assistant General Counsel for
Campbell Soup Company stated that the "damage to the Campbell Soup Company's
trademarks as a result of dilution 'is at the heart of our endorsement of dilution
legislation.'''IOf
A fwtber goal of the FTDA was to be consistent with the international treaties in "'ruch
the United States had previously engaged in the trademark areaYo According to the
House Report, a portion of the agreement during the "Uruguay Round of the GAIT
agreement include[d] a provision designed to provide dilution protection to famous
marks. nit 1 Therefore, IUl impetus for the passage of the FmA was the urgency in
complying with the terms of the agreement. Legislators furt:her asswned that the "passage
of a federal dilution statute would ...assist the executive branch in... negotiations with other
countries to secure greater protection for the famous maJks owned by U.S. companies.,,112
Rep. Carlos Morehead reiterated.. however that "foreign countries ['WOuld be] reluctant to
change their laws to protect famous U.S. marks if the United States, itself, (did not]
afford special protection for such marks. "Ill

protect against dilution caused by the unauthorized use of a famous mm on competitive
as well as non-competitive goods. lie TIlt FIDA also makes it clear that likelihood of
confusion is nOI necessary as a factor in dilution analySis.
The FTDA limits a claimant's remedies to injunctive relief "unless the person against
whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or 10
cause dilution of the famous mark."117 It enumerates several factors determinative of
wbether a mark is "dislincti ve and famous." III The FTDA's intent was to provide a
federally enforceable injunction as the main remedy for a successful dilution suil
However. it also provided for the awarding of damages in instances of willful intent. 119
In addition, the owner of the famous mark is entitled to any profits, and costs up to the
treble amounts as well as the destruction of any offending articles. llo It also makes
federal trademark registration a "complete bar" to a state dilution action, though il does
DOt preempt any state dilution laW.121

The FTDA's one notable improvement over any earlier federal dilution proposal is its
attempt to address First Amendment concerns raised by critics of the dilution doctrine.
The Act precludes a federal dilution cause of action against the "fair use of a famous
mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify
the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark."I22 It also renders
non-actionable the non-commercial use of a mark as well as its use in news reponing and
commentary. III
The fTDA, while seemingly straightforward in its approach to dilution law, only solves
some of the problems encountered by the Slate dilution laws. In the next sections the
strengths and weaknesses of the FTDA will be examined.

STRENGTHS OF THE FEDERAL TRADL"lARK DILUTION ACT OF 1995

lbe two main strengths of the FTDA lay within its legislative intent to solve the problems
associated ....ith the previous "patchwork" of stale dilution la....."5. By definition, a victim
of dilution, under the FTDA, should be able to nationally enforce an injunction against
the diluting use of the mark. Enforcing an injunction from state to state will DO longer
be scrutinized, thus making a dilution claim and injunction more nationally uniform. as
intended.
Second, it should provide for a measure of consistency in the application of dilulion
principles. Instead of federal courts applying state laws, the FTDA allows federal courts
to apply federal law. The federal cowts should be able to establish precedents based
upon the measmes prescribed in the FTI>A.

Similar to the 1988 version, the FTOA defines dilution as the "lessening of the capacity
of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or servicu, regardless of the presente
or absence of (I) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties.,
or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. " 11~ Although this definition is very
sfmilarto"thC"dilution by bluning" definition in the 1988 dilution provision, the FIDA's
legislative history dearly indicates that it protects against both dilution by blurring and
tamishmentY' The legislative history also reveals that the FTDA's intended scope is to

As a sidebar, the FTDA also notes that non--commercial, critical, and comparative
advertising uses of a famous mark are not subject to dilution law. These exceptions
should allow this Act survive First Amendment challtnge.
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WEAKNESSES OF THE FEDERAL TRAD£h.{ARK DlLUTIO}: ACT OF 1995
Wbil~ the fTDA bas improved upon the state dilution statul~S, its lack of anention to a
few impon8nt matters has left federal courts searching for e. ~fonn in~erp~ta~on and
application of dilution and the statute. In e~nce. the F"T?A IS no~ servlllg Its IlIte~ed
legislative purpose to date, due to the followmg shortconungs: an l~uate definition
of "dilution ,. its lack of a reconciliation with the Lanham Act's definiUon of trademark
protection, tbev.-eak application ofth~ "famous m~"~, the improper use of tests
to determine the existence of dilution, and the policy decISion not 10 preempt state laws.

•

dichotomy between exclusive conswner protection, as stated in the original text of the
Lanham AC~ and the inclusion of trademark owner protection in the FTDA altogether.
Abo. theu: IS no guarantee that, even with the new dilution definition and the seven
f~c~rs defining "famous," courts will do a bener job, in the long-run, at defining "true"
d~utl~n ~m s~pposed dilution. Without express resolution of the dichotomy , the
~~e~ng V1ewpo~1S OIl ~ JX)tential property-rights due to 8 trademark are left up to
ll'ldlVldual court tnt~retanon. 1be current lack of unifonnity by the courts in applying
those standards which are expressly delineated in the FTDA does not bode well for the
uniform interpretation of the implied reconciliation of the dichotomous viev.-points of the
FTIJA and the Lanham Act. Without Wlifonn application of botil express and implied
standards of the fTDA, legal claimants are left without consistent precedents.

Lack of II. Workable Dilution Defmition
First, the definition of dilution provided by the FTDA gives no additional insight into ~
problems of the state statutes in defining dilution. 1:!of ~'Di1utio~" ~s 50 broadly defi~d tn
the FTDA that any lessening of value could be considered dilution, and thus 5UbJect to
inj unction. llS
The lack of clarification, leaves trademark dilution open to ownership and monopolization
debates. The broad terminology used comes very close to providing the o~r of a
famous mark a monopoly on the mark itself, as well as almost anything resembling the

made
Proponents offederal trademark dilution action argue that a trademark can be "ov-ned."ll1i
In fact, the FIDA, itself. ref~rs to a trademark bolder as an owner of the mark. Ul
H"owever, based upon case law, others argue that a trademark "oVvller" does n~t ~ly O":ll
his trademark instead, he has a limited right in his trademark. "Ownership' us~d m
connection
trademarks is merely a figure of spee<:b to delineate the bolder of
different marks.l2.1 Becaus~, some argue a trad~mark is incapable of being "owned," there
can be no treSpass by an illicit user of a mark, just as an individual cannot sue for
trespass of real property if he does not ovm that property.)lt

""ith

One of the strongest opponents of trademark dilution protection, Geo~e . ~ddl~n,
argues that in order to grant statutory rights to a ~e~ark holder to ~J~m a ~rd
party's dilution of the mark essentially creates a copynght tn the trad~k.
Granttn8
a copyright of the mark, he argues, would be essentially the same as gIVIng the trademark
bolder a monopoly on the m.aJk as used in any context.

Weak "Famous Mark" Standards
T?e. fi~t criticism concerning the "famous mark" standards presupposes that the level of
dl stl:n~tlveness required for dilution protection sbould be the same as that required for
IraditlOnal trademark protettion.1l1 Under such an interpretation, virtually all trademarks
would be subject to dilution protection. Courts have been unable to come to agreement
on the definition of "fame," either before or after the passage of the FTDA III Mead
~ta held that before dilution prolcction would apply, a plaintiff must prove that its mark
IS not only strong, but famous among the general public, as ....'CII. Jn If the defendant's
market is nationwide, then the plaintiff's mark must also be nationally famous.
Consequentl y, under Mead Dora, the fact that a plaintiffs mark is well kno ....n in a
narrow product market would not be sufficient to trigger dilution protection.l3<1
Howevet',.since Mead Data, courts have i nt~rpretcd distinc·ti vencss differently. Either the
relted ~n the Mead Dala concurring opiruOIl which stated that strong, local
marks ~r marks In a Mp'OW product area could qualify for dilutiorr protection 1Ji1 or courts
had relOterpreted the majority opinion in Mead Data to mean that distinctiveness for
dilution puzposes, is the same as distinctiveness for tradcmark infringement purpoS~s.I16
COurts

The property-like right debatably conferred upon tra~emarks is ~ direct confli~t ~th
trademark law I\S delineated in the Lanham Act. As discussed preViously, the legJslatJ.\"e
. tent since the enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946 has seemingly changed from ilS
sole purrx;s-;to aid the consumer by easy identification of product quality, to additionally
aiding the consumer in identifying a mark in the marketplace. H?wever, the F!DA does
nothing to reconcile the two differing viev.points. In fact, It seems to Ignore the

Other circuits defined "famous" or "distiru::ti\"e" in yet other manners. m "The FOTA was
supposed to rem~y this incongruence between circuits, but has, instead, added a new
problem concermng "famous marks." The FTDA lists eight factors which are to be
considered in deciding upon the "fame" of a mark. The FroA's eight "famous factors"
~st closely res:emble th~ Second Circuit's majority deftnition of a famous mark, thus
uruformly applytng that definition at the federal leveL Tht eight "famous factors" are as
fo llo;'5: ( I) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark, (2) the
d~1ion and ~t oftbe use of the mark in connection .....ith the goods or services with
which the mark IS used, (3) the duration and extent of advertising and publicitv of the
mark, (4) the geographical extent of the trading area in whicb the mark is used: (5) the
channels of trad~ for the goods 01" services .....ith which the owner's mark is used, (6) the
degree of recognition of the marlc: in trading areas and chanllels of trade used by the
mark's OVt'llet' and the person against whom the injtmction is sought, (7) the nature and
ext~nt of use of the same or similar mark by third parties, and (8) whether the marl:: was
registered under the Act of March 3, J881 , or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the
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Lack of an Express Re<:onciliation with th~ Lanham Act

principal register. III

interpreted the FlDA have found thaI it prohibits both dilution by "blurring" and
"tarnishment... lso

Since the enactment of the FTDA, some thirty-five reponed cases have diJectly discussed
dUution. I:;9 "While some cases have protected the o,""ner.> of " famous marks" based upon
the factors delineated in the FTOA and based upon the majority opinion in Mead Dara,
other.> have left questions concerning this definition of '"famous." For instance, in
Ringling Bros. "1'. Urah Division o/Travel DePf.,'''' the U.s. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia held that the FTDA protects the holders of famous roarlcs against the
unauthorized use of marks that imitale, but are not identical.lo, the famous mark because
such use blun the famous mark' s distinctiveness. Even tM\J.gh Ringling Bros. had used
the bademark "The Greatest Show on Earth" in connection v.ith its cireus shows for many
years, the state of Utah was not enjoined from using a similar slogan "'he Greatest Snow
on Earth" to promote its skiing indUstry. I. 1 Utah's slogan was not considered to appeal
10 a market large enough to v.'8mlIl1 " fiunous" treatment
Conversely, "famous" has been applied to parties who are not well known. In Inrermatic,
Inc. v. Toeppenl<2 and Panavis/on International L.P. v. Toeppen, both Inlermatic, Inc. and
Panavision International L.P." l were described as ''famous marks" and, thus, were given
dilution prOlection. l ... Granting ''famous'' stams to these marks seems inappropriate when
testing these marks against the "famous" factors in the FTDA, the majority decision in
Mead Dala,lf! and the majority decision in Ringling BroS .IM An injunction was not
granted to the plaintiff in Ringling Bros. because ODe of the two patties involved was
deemed to not have marks famous enough 10 be recognized in connection with the goods
or services they represented. However, plaintiffs in both the Toeppen cases were granted
an injunction despite the obvious lack of fame of at least one of the parties io\-olved in
each case. According to the factors in the FTDA and the majority decision in both Mead
Data and Ringling Bros., a famous mark must be famous among the general public. If;
for instance, a plaintiff's mad is only well-known within a narrow product market, then
it arguably is not afforded dilution proteCtion as a famous mark. l"*7 Practitioners have
argued that neither Intermatic, Inc. or Pana.vision International L.P. could be considered
"famous" under the FTDA.I.I
Similarly, in a case settled out of court in January of 1997, Coca-Cola settled ....ith
Babson Bros. Co., an Illinois distributor of dairy and agricultural equipment, for an
undisclosed amount. Coca-Cola was attempting to marut a new soda, Surge, as part of
a $50 million advertising campaign during the Super Bowl. Based upon cases like
Toeppen. however, Coca-Cola settled fearing that Babson' Bros. Co. might prevail in •
dilution action as they had been using the name Surge on its products for decades, even
though its stams as a "famous" mark might be questionable . l~

Improper Use of Tests to Oetennine the Existence of Dilution
_

One,oft!!.~st significanl barriers, to date. to a finding of liability in ~veral ~s ~der
the FfDA bas been the requirement of proving dilution. Although 10 some SlruatlOns,
relief under the FTOA bas been easy to obtain, many trademark owners who contend that
their famous marks have been diluted have faced uphill battles. The courts that ha\"e
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When trademark owners have sought relief, demonstrating the exiSTence of tamishment
the courts have not hesitated to afford plaintiffs relief under the act. lSi When trademark
owner:s have not been able to show tarnishmenl, however, and have attempted, instead to
establish that marks on non-competing goods are likely to cause blurring, thev have had
•
less s uccess to date. II I
Tamishment
The fir.>t tamishment case decided under the FTOA V.lIS Hasbro Inc. v. Internet
En fertamme.nJ
Group. '" Hasbro, the make r of the children's board game
. "Candvland,"
brought acho~ .against the ~~~dants for use of the name "Candyland:' to id~'ntify a
~xua.1ly e"pllclt Internet site.
Hasbro claimed that its mark .....as associated v.ith .
lOnocence ~d wbole~mene.ss and would be "irreparably harmed" by the defendant's use
of the mark I.n COnnectlon V.1th a sexually explicit web site. is! The defendant argued that
CandYlan~ did not wanan.r. protection as a famous mark nor did the adult-oriented market
overlap WIth Hasbro's child-oriented markel. Thus, there was no possibility of confusion
bel\.~e~ the. :,",,'0 products.l ~ The federal judge agreed with Hasbro and granted a

preliminary Injunction against the defendant. If?

'R' US V. Akkaoui, lSI: the coun granted Toys 'R' Us an injunction
based ~n u.re FTDA. Toys 'R' US sued the defendants for using "Adults ' R' US" in
COllIleC1l.on WIth an ~ult-ori~nted -web page. The plaintiffs argued that its Toys ' R' Us
~k would be asSOCIated WIth sexual products if the defendants were able to continue
using the toy company's mark. U9 11te COwt found that Toys 'R' Us was famous enough
10 warrant FTDA protection, and granted a preliminary in,'unction against the
defendants. 16IO
A similar case, Toys

Blurring
The. outcomes of blurring cases have been less predictable than those categorized as
tamishment cases.
For example,
Sunbeam Producrs, Inc. "1'. West Bend CO.161
addressed the fact that the defendant was marketing a stand mixer that looked verY similar
to the S.land mixer Sunbeam marbted and that Sunbeam was the first and only ~ompany
to contmuously use, promote and sell a stand mixer that looked as this one did. l61 The
COM found that Sunbeam must establish ,·that it is the owner of a famous mark
trademark, that West Bend's use of its stand mixer configuration (affixed with) the West
Bend mark applied. thereto commenced after Sunbeam' s marie became famous and tbat
such use by West Bend cause(d] dilution of the distinctive quality of Sunbeam 's famous
marks."16l The court found that the trade dress of Sunbeam's sland mixer was famous,
and that su~~ trade dress "WD$ diluted by the defendant, therefore an injunction was
granted agatnst the defendant. I~
In Levi Strauss & Co. v. San Francisco 415 Co.,'" the court also granted an injunction
based on trade dress as the defendant was manufacturing j eans with stitching similar to
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the famous stitching on j eans manufactured by Levi Strauss & Co.

In a blurring case of a different nature OO""-e ...er, an inj unction '.vas not granted as the
coure determined that the issues raised in this cases invoked FiIst Amendment concerns.
In Dr. &uss Emerprises v. Penguin Books USA, lnc.,lIA the plaintiff sued .the defe~t
for publishing a parody of The Cat and ,he Hal based on the OJ . Slm~n
Penguin claimed it could use the mark., as parody was protected by the exception m the
F1UA that permits "non-commercial use of a mark. .. 1~1 The court held that the " F~t
Amendment would aoply to this usc of the trademarks at issue and that as an expresSive
use, this use is exemPt from the reach of the Fedeml TradelIl'al'k Dilution ACt."l61

!ria.I.

Similarly, in Elvis Presley Enlerprises v. Captce ,l6f th~ trial court fount1'that ~nj~ctive
relief could not be granted to the plaintiff. While the court did not expressly dlsrtUss the
use of the name ofa restaurant, "The Velvet Ehis," as a parody, it did compare the facts
l1U
of the case to Harmel Foods Corp. v. Jim Hel1Sen Products, Inc. where by the cOwt
held that "parodies do little to diminish the mental connection already formed between
a plaintiff's mark and its prodUCL .. m The Fifth Circuit Coun of A~S. recently
reversed Captce, resting its judgement solely on a traditional trademark infringement
analysis.In
While the courts have easily decided cases involving dilution by blurring in instances of
trade dress and parody, they have had more difficulty in deciding upon cases invoh'ing
marks of varying degrees of fame when issues of trade dress and parody are not
present. III
Thus far courts that have applied the FTDA to blurring claims not in\'Olving parody or
trade ~ have adopted the six·factor blurring test set oUt in Mead [)a,om to detennine
if dilution exists. In Mead Data, Judge Sweet identified six factOrs as relevant to tilt
dilution--by. bluning inquiry: (1) similarity of the marks, (2) the similarity o,f the products
covered bv the marks, (3) the sophistication of consumers, (4) predatory lDtcnt. (5) the
renown of the senior mark, and (6) the renov.n of the junior mark.17S One problem in
using the " Mead Data test" in connection v.ith the FTOA is, according to Ihe act's
express language, the plaintiff need not prove a "likelihood of confusion" as .one does in
traditional trademark infringement disputes. Moreo ...er, the Mead Data test IS much too
similar to the test common1y used to detcnnine the likelihood of confusion in a traditional
trademark infringement suit.

In a traditional trademark suit, for instance. the ultimate issue is generall y ....1lether the
defendant's conduct creates a likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinary
consumers ....,ould be mislead or confused as to the source, affiliation or sponsorship of
8. good or service. In Jardach e Enterprises l'. Hogg IVyld,l'l. for i~tance, the tenth circuit
identified four factors to determine likelihood. of confusion, applYIng the concepts found
in the Mead Data test: (1) relatedness of the goods,
(2) similarity of the marks, (3)
l!kely ~S!C.;...of purchaser care, and (4) the defendant 's intent in ~l.ecti~g the m~.111
While the remaining two factors in the Mead Data test do not tle"'m VIIth the typtcal
Iikelihood.of..confusion analysis, they also do not tie·in with the intent of the F1UA to
protect famous marks, regardless of the fame ofa j unior mark. The "renown of the junior
16

mark" factor generally favors the defendant in 11 dilution case, as il affords a level of
protec~ion to lesser knov.n marks., even if such a mark is, effectively, diluting the famous
mark .m sorn:e manne~. The theory underlying this faclor is that a lin1~known jwt.ior
mark 15 not likely to dilute the famous mark on a recognizable level. Typically, a junior
~k that is not well known or that has just entered the market ....ill be protected wxler
this factor, as the junior mark will almost never be deemed famous. III
Despite the recognized theoretical difference between lilcelihood of confusion and dilution
by b~urring. ~crc. has been little difference in practice because the presently accepted
blumng ana hkelihood of confusions tests are so similar.
Despite the similarities of both tests, there exists yet another apparent inconsistency
betwe~n the ,\.fead Data test and the FTDA, which expressly stales that dilution is the
lesserung of the famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services., regardless of
the presence or absence of competition between the famous mark and other parties.11!l
The ~feod Dora test, however, considers the similarity of the products in detennining
bl~g. 11 is arguably inconsistent for the FTOA to e liminate competition bet\o\."een
pa.ru~s as a
whil~ the couns continue to consider similarity of the products as a
blumng factor In applYIng the FTDA. Nonetheless, courts applying the Mead Data test
have not acknowledged the inconsistency. Rather, they have explained the similaritv
factor as being imPOI1ant in this type of blurring analysis because "if the products sold
under the marks in dispute are alike, there is greater likelihood that blurring will occur
in the mind of the consumer."110

rae.tor

~I ~s from the trend that courts will continue to consider the Mead Da,a test, and
ns ~erent reliance em the similarity and fame of all parties brought fonh in a case, as
an Important factor in detenninin~ the likelihood of dil ution by blmring when parody or
trade dress are not present factors m a case. 'This fact, \\-ill continue to pose a substantial
chaileIlge to trademark o~ers attempting to stop the unauthorized use of their mark.

For example, in Ringling Bros. v. B.E. Windows 1' 1 and Ringling Bros. v. Utah Divition
0f. Tr~1 Deveiopment,11'1. the courts refused to grant injunctions against the defendants.
RinglIng Bros. sought to enjoin B.E. Windows from using "The Greatest Bar on Earth"
to describe a bar atop the World Tnlde Center.11l Similarly, they attem pted to enjoin
U~ from using "1be Greatest Snow on Earth.. to promote its ski industry. I'" In H.E
WIndows, the co~. held that this WII..5 not a case of blurring as "Ringling's trademark is
a common descnpuve phrase, rather than a single distinctive word." and that the use by
the defendant was not v.idely recognized, and thus could not be construed as a famous
use.1I5 Similarly. in the Utah Dil'ision ofTravtl Del'. case, the court ruled that the use
of the slogan was not famous as it was not .....idel}' recognized outside of Utah. l16

HO...."e\'el'. in I'!'ermatic, inc. v. Toeppen ll1 and Panavis ion international LP. l'. Toeppen ,
both Intermatlc, Inc. and Panavision International L.P.IP were described 11..5 "famous
marks" and, thus, were given dilution protection. "' Once these two marks were
de:e~ed f~ous, no provisions were applied to determine if the mark Toeppeo was
IlSmg tn each lIlStance were considered famous.
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?een . . .

1be Failure of the FTDA to Preempt State La....'S
Finally, the fact that the federal statule is not intended to preempt state la",'S works against
the strength of the FTDA. The nDA is expressly designed to augment the state laws,
nOI preempt them. l90 This, however, does not seem to coincide with the Lanham Act's
desire for unifonnit)'. Prior to the passage of the new legislation, the L~ Act
preempted the field of unfair competition in all ~ it addressed. The. ~X1stence of
state and federal st8ULtes only makes logical sense If state statues are limited to those
activities that are solely intrastate in accordance ....ith the Commerce Clause. However,
it seems unlikely that a famous mark would ever exist as sMely intrastate given the broad
interpretation of the Commerce Clause b)' the cou.$.

The FTDA was designed to rule concurrently ....ith state laws to allow plaintiff's to seek
the best dilution remedy available to them. Therefore, in stateS where dilution law is
more specifi c or imposes harsher penalties upon those guilt)' of dilution, a plaintiff could
sue under the more developed state law without fear that the lesser developed FTDA
would preempt their action.
However, two potentially hannful effects to the intent of the FTDA arise ~ue to
concurrence of state and federal law in addressing dilution. First, national compames are
still able to bring a claim to any state court. Therefore, fonan shopping for the best legal
outcome has oot been eliminated, as was one intent of the FTDA. Second, to guarantee
a national injunction against the defendant in the event of the plaintiff's victory, the
plaintiff must rely upon the decision of the federal court to reconcile and apply both state
and federal law in cases brought before it. Consequently, plaintiffs cannot rely upon the
more developed state statutes to protect them against dilution on a national basis ~~ss
courtS consistently apply 5tate and federal dilution statutes concurrently. Plamtiffs
effeeti"'ely risk exchanging more developed law for greater protection. Th.i~ risk. mi~
be justifiable if the federal courts were accurately and consistently applymg . dilUlJon
standards and definitions, instead of infringement standards, thus SUggestlD& that
concurrent application of state and federal law might also be consistent

The FTDA "''9.S designed to protect ·'famous" marks from dilution. Nowhere in its
legislative ~ory d!d it limit such protection based upon the fame of the junior mark.
If the FTDA 15 to bve up to its legislative intent, then courts should be protecting the
famous~, regardless ofthc fame attributed to the junior mark.. Therefore, the courts
should e~~e ~e use .of a famous mark test on the jurrior mark and grant the senior
~I~er an lDJunctIOn agmnst the "Cree ride" the j unior mark enjoys when using a mark
sundar to that of a famous senior mark.. 19J

lRere exists a great need to change the judicial trend associated with the FTDA. As
great~ reliance is placed upon dilution provisions due to the growing number oflntemet
domam name cases, many of which solely rely upon di lution to prevent the unauthorized.
use ?f a trademark as a domain name for a Web site entirely unrelated 10 the good or
service related to the mark, the FTDA will become the primary vehicle used to support
such action. I~
~e further definition of a "'famous" mark may also be necessary to remain congruent
;-'lth both the T~~emark Law Revision Act of 1988 and GAIT. Originally, the FTDA
md~d a pro:,:slon that ~~~ a "famo~ mark" to be registered on the Principal
RegLSter. AddillO~.lly, anb-dllutlon protectIon of unn:gistered marks is a move away
from a .stated goallJl the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 to encourage the use of,
and reliance on the fedCI1i11 ttademark registration system.
The Clinton administration,
among others, expressed the concern that a forma l registration of a mark would be
conu:ary to U.S. efforts:o "persuade fore ign governments to loosen overly fonnalistic
reqwrements for protection of intellectual property." 11Il However, the failure to include
a. ~r definition of "dilution" or " famous mark,n along with the use of ill-considered
dilutIon tests may be more baImfuI in attnlcting foreitD companies wishing to do business
in the: United States.

I"

As a result of these weaknesses, the intent of the FTDA to act as an instrument to !mite
the state laws and decrease forum shopping is failing. Many of the cases argued undtr

~e co~ need ~ develop a new deflDition for "famous." To more uniformJy detennine
~ous staws, It would ~ prudent to require a mark to be registered on the Principal
Re~ster, ~ was propose~ I~ ~ FTDA's original form. Great latitude shouJd be given
to famous maries as. p~tl~ lJI sucb cases. If the true intent of the FDTA is to protect
famous marks from dlluUOn m order to protect the holder's investment in the marks then
fam~us marks ~uld be protected from any type of dilution, whether it be blurri~ or
~hment, WIthout regard to the renown of the junior mark, or the similarity of the
Junior mark or the producr it represents to the senior mark and its product. Either
stronger language needs to be added to the FTDA or the courts need to consider the
legislati"'e intent of the act in interpreting its goals and purpose. Thus far, rru1y famous
marks have often suffered uphill battles against maID of lesser fame and renown
Es~ntial1y, the immense fame of the "famous mark" has hindered its course of actio~
ag~nst. smaller, less famous marks--a result directly opposed to the intent of the
leglslanon to protect famous marks from such gradual whittling away of the famous
mark's value.
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CONCLUSIONS Al.'TI SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION

The existence of the weaknesses discussed above, despite the evident strengths of the
FTOA, have contributed greatly to the: ineffectiveness of the: FTDA in fully realizing its
191

-

th~ f!DA ~ave
ithin the jurisdictions of the district couns or U.S. appellate courts
.....'thin CalifOrnia, New York, Illinois, Michigan, New Jef'SCY, and Ohio, where the
strongest and most developed state laws concerning dilution exist.

intent. It has been ineffeeti\'C in completely proteCting truly famous marks.
Cowts
have begun using tests similar to those used in infringement cases, making ~ FTDA no
more than an extended infringement provision in many ca5es. 1t1 Addltlonally, the
continued lack: of clarification of the defmition of dilution in the FTDA perpetuales
problems experienced due to the similar lack of a consistent and worka~le definition
unde r state laws. The fimdarnental dichotomy betv,'eC(l the expressed lDtent of tbt
Lanham Act and the FIDA also presents problems .....ith the future of dilution theory in
the court system.

..... -~ --

Since many couns seem 10 be skeptical of dilution by blurring theory without the
existence of trade dress or parody, evidence of actual dilution might tip the scales of
justice in the famous mark's favor in such instances. For example, the trademark owner
might decide to condUCI a survey to establish empirical data in suppon of blurring. The
survey might include a measure of the strength of the mark being blUlTtd. Fo~lowing
such a measure, tbe survey ""ould ask respondents to answer if they recogrnu any
product or name given in a list of products and names similar to ~t of th~ famous ~k
The junior mark accused DC diluting the famous mark ....-ould be Included tn such 8 list to
detenninc if such a junior mark has any diluting effect based upon consumer recognition,
Cowts could usc such data to detennine the extent of a jtmior mark's dilution affect
While conducting such a survey 'would be no simple task. as de\'cloping 8 representative
and non-biased survey and consumer pool is difficult. such empiri!!aJ. data might be
useful.
A plaintiff might also want to stress to the court that, if the defendant prevails, the
occurrence of dilution will only be encouraged, as others will fee l free to use the
plaintiffs mark. The fact that one defendant may not singuJarly cause dilution may be
enough not to legally enjoin him from such unauthorized usc. As explained by Professor
J. Tbomas McCarthy, however, "the defendant will argue that its use is 50 small and
insignificant in comparison to the power and strength of a famous mark that any injury
to the capacity of the mark to remain strong is unimportant and de minimis. 1be theory
of dilution by blurring is that if one small user can blur the sharp focus of the famous
marX 10 uniquely signify one source, than another and another small user can and ....ill do
so._[tbereforel, significant injury is caused by the cwnulative effect."]" Foresight by the
courts to envision the cumulative effect of many "singularly insignificant" defendants
would be a significant step towards eliminating dilution efforts due to blurring.
The cumnt trend of decisions has also made it clear that essential to the plaintiffs case
is the development of evidence supporting predatory intent on the part of the defendant.
However, deyelopment of such evidence sbouJd only be relevant in detennining damages
within a case brought about under the FTDA . Owners of "famous marks" should be
afforded the protection of a preliminary injunction from the court ....ithout the ne:d .to
prove predatory inlenL In arguing for the awarding of damages. however, the platntlff
should attempt to prove that the junior mark or product was acting outside of the
botmdaries of the First Amendment and was attempting to dilute by tarnishment,
disparaging the name or certain qualities associated with ilS product. This could be done
by establishing a fJK]tive for the junior mark' s behavior, by demonstrating the manner in
which the junior product or service was marketed, or by establishing that the intent of the
junior mark was to use the fame of the senior mark to gain notoriety, to name a few.

2. See. e.g., John C. Blattner, In/erne' Domain Names and TrademtJrK Rights: The
Confusion is Likely to Get Worse Before it Gets Belter, 76 Mich. 8J. 1344 (1 997); Gerald
L Ford, Dilulion Swveys New Challenges, 497 PLllPar 157 (1997); Megan Gray.
Defending Against a Dilution Claim: A Practitioners Guide, 4 TEX . I"'TEIJ... PRO? LJ.
205 (1996); Thomas Jennings, What 's in a Corporate NQJ1U!: Avoiding Trademork and
Other Conflicts. 85 ILL. B.J. 435 (1997); Melanie Routh, TrademarK Dilution and the
Effect of the Federal Trademark DilUllon Act, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 253 (1997); Jeffrey
Samuels & Linda Samuels, Famous Marks Now Federally Protected against Dilulion, 15
1. Pt.·B. POL'y & MARKETING 307 (1996); Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine:
Towards a Reconciliation with the Lanham Act, 6 FORDHAM I.P., MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 105
(~ 995); Andrew Baum & MarX Eps1ein, New Dilution Act Used 10 Evict 'Cybersquauers,'
NAT'!. LJ., Jan. 27, 1997 at C3 ; Dominic Bencivenga, Attorneys Longfor Guidance on
PrOving ErOSion, N.Y.LJ., Apr. 3, 1997 at 17; Ethan Hornitz & Eric A. Prager, What is
Dilurion and How is it Pro\'ed? N.Y.L.l Dec 2, 1996 at 20; Richard Kirkpatrick &
Sheldon Klein, FederoliztJtion Trend Culminates in Dilulion Law, KArt. LJ., June 17,
1996 at 013; Theodore C. Max, Dilution Act May Limit Commercial Parodiu. KArL
L.1., May 20, 1996 at CI3; Jonathan E. Moskin, HR. 1295. which is in/ended to create
a new cause oj action for lhe dilution of 'famous ' maries. may be construed as granting
owners rights that are overbroad. NAT'L L.1., Sept. 4,1995 III 85; Steven Shapiro, Use
of 'Mead Data' Test Dilutes the Dilution Act. NAT'L L J., May 12, 1997 at C2; Melvin
S~ensky, U.S. Enacts Federal Trademor! Dill/tion Act, LP. WORLDWIDE (1996); and
L~ Samuels, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Interpreting and Appl)ing
the ;\ew Law (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).

I
I

3. The Lanham Act, the more common name for the Trademark Act of 1946, as
amended, is codified as IS U.S.C. I05H127 (1994).
4. ld. at 1114 (marks registered with the U.S . Patent and Trademark Office); id at 1125
(unregistered marks). The unauthorized use of a trademark is often referred to as the
'~unior" usc. Subsequently, the use b)' the owner of the trademark is referred to as the
"senior" use. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. \'. Bayer AG, 14 F3d 733, 740 (2d Cir. 1994).
5. See Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance oj the Dilurion Rationale jor
Trademark-Trade Identity PrOiecrion, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289, 290 (1985).
6. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis ojTrademarlc PrOtection, 40 JiARv. L. REv. 813
(1927) .. While there are earlier references to dilution, ~chechter's article is generally
recogruzed as the frrst full articulation of dilution.

7. Jd at 825.

8. Pattishall, supra note 5.
REFERENCES
.. 1. FederafTrad.emark: Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104·98, 109 Stat. 985 (l996).
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9. See, e.g., David Welkowitz. Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAhl> L.REv. 531
(1991); and Kathleen Hollingsv.nnh. No Retroactil>e Application oj New Dilution Act.
! Co urt Rules, WEST' S LEGAL NEWS, Jan 8, 1997 at '"I.
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See KENNETH CLARKSON, ET AL., WEST'S BUSINESS LAW 133 (1 995)
(Appropriation is the "use of one person's name or likeness by another withoul
permission and for the benefit of the user.").
10.

I I.

Carson v. Here's Johnny po rtable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).

12. ld.
13. Codified in the Lanham Act, 15 USc. §11 14 (I) (1994).
14. A compilation of factors that contribute to a likelihooa of confusion exist in the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §717 (1 938). However, that compilation W8ir,removed in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOl'D) OF TORTS (1 977).
15. 1be tort of fiaudul ent misrepresentation involves the use of misrepresentation alx:i
deceit for personal gain. It includes several elements: misrepresentation of material facts
or conditions v.ith knowledge that they arc false or with reckless disregard for the truth;
intent to induce another to rely on the misrepresentation; justifiable reliance by the
deceived party; damages suffered as a result of the reliance; and causal connection
between the misrepresentatio n and the injury suffered.
16. Vuinon etFils, SA v. Crown Handbags, 492 F. Supp. 1071, 1979 (S.D.N.Y.1979),
affd, 622 F .2d 577 (2d Cir. 1980).

(Michie 1994); Idaho, IOAHO CODE §48-512 (Supp 1995); Illinois. Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 76S,

para. 1040-42 (supp. 1995); Iowa, low.... CODE ANN. §548.11 .2 (West 1995); Louisiana,
LA. REv. STAT. ANK. § SI:223.1 (west 1995); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. M"N. tit. 10,
§1.530 (~est 1994); Massachusetts, MASS. 00.'. LAWS ciJ.. 110B. §12 (v.'est Supp. 1995);
MISSOun, Mo. REv. STAT. §417.061. 1 (1992); Montana, MONT. CoOE A.'IN. §30-I3-334
(1995); Nebraska, NEB REv. STAT. §87-122 (1 994); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. §350-A:12 (Supp. 1995); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. M'N . §57-3- IO (Michie 1995);
Nev.' York, N.Y. GEN Bus. LAW §368-d (McKinney 1995); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT.
§647.l07 (1 993); Pennsylvania, 54 PA. CONS. STAT. A-....rK. §1124 (Supp. 1995); Rhode
Island, Rl. OEN LAWS §6-2-12 (Supp 1992); Tennessee, TENN. CODE A'lN. §47-25-512
(supp 1994); Texas. TEx. Bu s. & CO;\1. CODE Ar-.'N. §16.29 (West 1995); Washington,
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §19.77.l40 (West 1995). Ohio has adopted dilution into its
comm~n law. Ameritcch, Inc. V. American Info. Technologies Corp., 81 1 F.2d 960, 965
(6th C~. 1987). Michigan has also adopted common law measures WIder Sons Co. v.
SuroWl'tz, 209 F.Supp. 59. (E.D. Mich. 1962). New Jersey has ex.pressly adopted a
common law cause of action under the follo"'ing Chanel, In~. v. Casa Flora Co., 24 1
A.2d 24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967), cm. denied, 242 A2d 381 (N.l 1968). For
a good s~ of each state's laws and important cases on dilution, see Federal
Trademark Dllutlon Act of 1995: Testimony o n H.R. 1295 before the Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellec:tual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104'" Cong., I"'
Sess. (1995), espeCially those statements made by Thomas E. Smith Chair I\.merican Bar
Association Section of Intellectual Property Law.
. ,.

24 . See supra note 2; 134 CONGo REc. H10419 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (statements by

26. For the:full text of the Model State Trademark Bill, see SELECTED l/'o.lELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND UNFAIR CoMPETITION STATUTES, REGULATIONS & TREATIES 21-23 at 4048 (Roger E. Schechter ed., 1995). The dilution section of the Model State Tmdemark
Bill provides in pertinent part, the follov.iog:
~e ~vmer of a ~k whi<:h.is f~us in this state shall be entitled, subject to the
pnnclples of eq~ty, to an InJuncuon against another's use ofa mark. commen~ing
after the owner's mark becomes famous, whic h causes dilution of the distinctive
q~ty of the o'WO~r'.s mark, and to obtain such other relief as in provided in this
section. In detemumng whether a mark is famous, a court mav consider factors
su~h as, b~t n~t limited to: the degree of inherent or acquired -distinctiveness of
the mark. m this state; the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection
with the g~s ~d services; the duration and extent of advertising and publicity
of the .mark III this state; the geographical extent of the trading area in which the
mark IS used; the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
owner's mark is used; the degree of recognition of the owner's mark in it and in
the other's trading areas and channels of trade in this state; and the nature and
extent of use of the same or similar mark by third parties.

and in response to Rep. Kastenmeier).

27.

17. Jd.
18. Kenneth 1. Pan, The "Unmllural" Expansion o/ Trademark Rights: Is a Federal
Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGiS. J. 441 (1994).

19.

Id. at 459.

20. 264 N.V.S. 459 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 260 N.Y.S. 821 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept 1932), affd, 188
N.E. JO (N.Y. 193J).

21. [d.

22. See e.g. H.R. 11592, 72d Co ngo (1932) at Secl2(d)(3)
23. Act ofMa), 2,1947, ch. 307 §7a, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (codified. as amended, at
MASS. GEl\. LAWS M"N., ch. 110B, §12 ('Nest 1990)).

Port, supra note 18 at 433.

25_ Those states ",ruch have codified a dilution starute include: Alabama, AL .... CODE
28. Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades Inc. 369N E 2d 1162 (N' Y
1977).
"
. .
_ ..
§8-12-17 (supp. 1993); Arkansas, ARK. COO£. M'N. §4-71-113 (Michie 1993); California
""': CAL. "BUr.&: PROF. CoDE §14330 (West 1995); Connecticut, CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN.
§ 35-111 (West 1995); Delaware, DEL. CODE A}.;'N. Tit. 6, §33 13 (Supp. 1994); Florida, ! 29. /d. at 1165.
FLA. STAT. A.>.m. §495.1S1 (West Supp. 1995); Georgia, GA. CoDE M'N'. §IO-l-4S I
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30. IdatI166.

of development of the common and federal stannary law of trademarks and unfair
competition.").

31. See Pon, supra note 18, at 44 1.

32. Pan. supra note 18, at 44 t. Port cites a search of LEXlS on March 30, 1994 for all
cases involving dilution between the years of 1977 and 1994.

45. Supra note 3-4 and accompanying text
46. J. McCARTlIV, I TRADEMARKS A"D U"FA IR COMPETITIO" Sec 5 04
1984).
'
. . , at 140 (2ded.

33. R£sTATF.MENT OF lli'FAlR CoMPETITION §25 emt. B (1995).
34. Susan L. Serad, One Year After Dilution's Entry into Federal Trademark Law, 32
•
WAKE FOREST L. REv . 215, 221 (1997).

v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,•Inc., 875

35. See, e.g., Mead Data Central, lnc.
F.2rl
1026, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Celozzi-Ettelson Che\Tolet, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1987), affd in pan, 855
F.2d 480, 482 (7th Cir. 1988)..
36. See. e.g.. supra IlOte 25; Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F .Supp. 1166, 1175 (C.D.
Cal. 1986), aJf'd, 830 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1981).
37.

47. Handler. supra note 39, at 274.

48. ld. at 285 (cites H.R. REP. No. 944, 76th Cong., II Sess. 4 (1 939»; United States
Jaycees \'. Commodities Magazine, Inc., 66 1 F.Supp. 1360, 1]68 (N.D. Iowa 1987).
49. Uni ted States Jaycees. 661 F.Supp. at 1368.

50. Supra note 40 and accompanying text
51. Id at 1277.
52. Id

Serad, swpra IlOte 34.
53. Lanham Act, Sec. 45, 15 U.S.C. Section 11 27.

38. Citing Madrid Proloeo/lmplementation Act and Federal TradEmark Dilution Act of
1995: Hearings on H.B. 1170 and H.R. 1195 Before the Subcomm. On Courts and
Intellectual Property of the How;e Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Congo 124 (1995), at
89 (Statement of James K. Baughman, Assistant General COWlSeI for Campbell Soup

Company).
39. M. Handler, Are rhe State Anti-Dilwtion Laws Compatible with the National
Protection oj Trademarlc.t? 75 TRADElI.tARK REP. 269. 273 (1985) ("The strong
antimonopoly sentiment of that era would have sensed~.an attempt to fasten on the
American people a new speciesofmo!lOpoly.") See aiso Paul Heald, Federal Intellectwal
Property l.4w and the Economics oj Preemption , 76 IOWA L. REv. 959, 1006 (1991)
(discusses efforts of early supporters of the Lanham Act to con\ince others thal
trademarks would not be the governmental grant of exclusive, monopolistic rights).

40. Commi/lee on Parents, S. REP. No. 1333. 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1274. 1277 (1946).
41. See Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and linfair Competition: A Critical History of
Legol Thoughl. 69 TRADEMARK REp. 305, 330 (1979) (an.analysis of economic theories
and how they have influenced the development of trademark law).
42. See id. at 330.
~.

54 . . .Please note that the ~ Act has been amended on several occasions.
Adchnonally, attempts at adding trademark dilution provisions to the Lanham Act
occumd before 1988. H~~et, for ~ PUIpOses of this diSCUSSion, ......1: have skipped
~ ~e 1988 Trademark R eVISion Act which deaJ t directly with the anti-dilution issue most
slIIlIlar to the FlDA.
55. Pub. Law 1'\0. 100-667, 102 Stat ]935.
56. Laura M. Slenuk, Dilution Low in the Uniled Star~s and Carwda: A R~view oj th~
Slate oj the l.4w and a Proposal for United Stales Dilution Protection 83 TRADEMARK

REP. 205, 222 (1993).

.

,

57.
Trademark:. Law Revision Act of 1988' S. Rep . N0515
100th C ong., 2 d Sess.
(1988).
.,

58. ld

59. Id
60. Id.
61. S. REP. No. 525, 100th Cong .• 2d Scss. ( 1988).

S. REp J'jo. 133], supra note 40, at 1274.

62. 1d

44. Handler, supra note 39, at 273 (Any anempt to replace fraud. and deceit as the
underlying theory of tradtmark protection "is antithetical to the very origins and course
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63. ld. See also Heather C. Steinmeyer & Alyssa Dudkowslci, Nation-by-f'tiarioT/ SllrIIey:
Protections for Well-mown and Famous Trademarks, IP WORLDWIDE, ~ay/1une 1997
(listing of major world nations and their laws, treaties, and court cases defirung trademark
.
protection).

79. Su id. at 1038 (stating that LEXlS "''8.5 not a nationally famous mark, as only 2%
of the general public recognized the LEXIS mark as describing Mead's service in a
survey; conversely. DuPont, Buick. and Kodak were widely recognized, thus making them
distincth'e enough).
80. Id. at 1045.

64 . ld
65. S. REP. No. 1333, lOOth Congo Sect. 36 at 1274. (1988).

•

66. Id.

81. See Megan E. Grey, Defending Against Q Dilution Claim: A Practitioner 's Guide,
4 TEx. l1o.TELL. PROP. LJ. 205, 213 (1 996) ("In order for the remedy to be effective ....<ith
a trademark used nation-wide, the injunction must be nation-....ide.").

134 CONO. REc. 516972 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (stakments ofJtep. DeConciru);

82. David Sven Villwock. 71re Federal Trademark Dilurion Act of 1995. 6 J. ART &
Em. L. 213, 218 (1996).

68. Only one state, Washington, provi.des for money damages if the pl~tiffcan prove
that"a subsequent user willfully intended to trade on the registrant's reputalton or to cause
dilution of the owner's mark.. .. See WASH. REv. CODE A,-...rN . § 19.77.160 (West 1992).

83 . See David S. Welko"'itz, Preemption. Exuate"ilor fality, and the Problem of State
Anlwi/urion Laws, 67 Tut. L. REV. 1,]-4 (1992) (explaining that extraterritorial remedies

67

134 CONO. REc. HI04 19 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kestenmeier).

69. See Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F.Supp. 1031 ,
rev 'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).

70. See, e.g., Mead Data Central, 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 198~) ~olding that L~S as
used for legal on-line database "''8.5 not famous enough for dllutlOn purpo~s as 11 was
only known to Jegal researcbers); Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mec~ca! Trades,
369N.E2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that the plaintiff's mark was not dlStmctlve so as
to assm dilution); Tiffany & Co v. T iffany Productions, 264 N.Y.S. 459 (Sup. Ct.), QjJ'1,
260 KY.S. 821 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1932), affd 188 N.E. 30 (N.Y. 1933) (wh~ the
Tiffany name for jewelry \\0'35 considered well-known enough by consumers to be dlluted).
71 . Mary Ann Alford, Exec. Vice President oftbe International Trademark Association,
Testimony Mfore the House of Representati~·es Committee on Intellectual Property, 1995
WL 435750 (July 19, 1995, F.D.C .H.)

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, ESA, .Inc., 702 F.Supp. 1031, rev 'd
on other grounds , 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cit. 1989).

75 . Id. at 1035.

76. Id at 10]9-40.

are unconstitutional because they "disrupt the federal scheme, whic h allows individuals
states to devise and implement their own laws when there is no federal reason w prevent
such individuality").

84. Mead Data Central, [nco v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F.Supp. 1031, rell 'd
all other grounds, 875 F.2d 1026, 1042 (2d Cir. 1989).

85. Id at 1030-31.
86. See Pattishall, supra note 5, at 301.
81. See id.
88. See, e.g., Cue Publ'g Co. V. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 259 N .Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y.A.D.
1965); Tiffany &: Co. ·v. The Boswn Club, Inc., 231 F.Supp. 836 (0. Mass. 1964); and
Polaroid Corp. V. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F.2d 8]0 (7th Cit. 1963).

89. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life lns. Co. V. Massachusetts Life Ins. Co, 249
N.E.2d 586 (Mass. 1969) (the plaintiff argued that the similarity of tile defendant's name
to its own diluted its 0"'"'11 name); Francis H. Legett & Co. V. Pternier Packing Co., 140
F.5upp. 328 (D. Mass. 1956) (the plaintiff argued that the slogans used by both
companies were similar, and would., thus, dilute the distinctiveness of its own in relation
to its business); Clairel Inc. V. Save-Way Indus., Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1980),
tJIIfI!ttded by 21 1 U.S.P.Q. 495 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (the plaintiff claimed that the similarity
of the defendant's mark to the Claiml mark would dilute the association of its mark "'ith
its product).

90. Su Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.SA, Inc., 702 F.Supp. 1031,
rev'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 1026,1030 (2d Cir. 1989).

77. Id

91. Cue Publ'g CO.

- 78. III aF I031-32.

V.

Colgate-Palmolive Co., 259 N.Y.S.2d 239, 246 (N.Y AD. 1965).

92. Port, suprQ note 18, at 454-55.
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93 . Id.

remedies set fonh in sections 35 (a) and 36, subject to the discretion of the court
and the principles of equit)'. The ownership by a person of a valid registration
~e~ the A~ of March 3. 1881 or the Act of February 20, 1905 or on the
pnnclpai regIster shall be. a complete bar to an aClion against that person, with
rtspec1 to that mark, that IS brought by another person under the common law or
a statute of a slate and that seeks to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness of a
mark, label, or form of advertisement. The following shall not be actionable
under thi~ section:. ~air use of a famous mad: by another person in comparative
commercial advertISing or promotion to identify the competing goods or services
of the owner of the famous mark; noncommercial use of the mark' all forms of
Dews reporting and news commentary. Section 45 of the Trademark Act of 1946
(15 U.S.C. 1127) is amended by inserting after the paragraph defining when a
mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned" the follo....ing: "The. tenn ' dilution'
means the le~ening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or semces. regardless of the presence or absence of competition between
the owner of a famous mark and other parties. or likelihood of confusion mistake
or deception." This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect
on the date of enactment of this Act

94. Id

95. See, e.g., Ho",'Ud 1. Shire, Dfhnion Versus Deceptfon--Are Stale Anti-dilution /..a¥.'1
an Appropriate Alternative ro the Law of Infringement. 77 TRADEMARK REp. 273, 275
(1987); Michad L Taviss, In Search of a Consistt.nt Trademark. Dilution Tes!: Mead
Dora Central, Inc. v. Toyora Moror Sales, u.s.A.., Inc., 58 U. CIK L. REv. 1449, 1455
(1990).

•

96. Dreyfus Fund. Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 19&1).

•

97. Id al 1125.
9&. See, e.g., Shire, supra note 95 , at 295.

99. Su 141 C~G. R£c. H35 n ( March 22. 1995) (statement of Rep. Morehead).
100. See, e.g.. CONGo REC. H14317 (Dec. 12, 1995) (remarts of Rep. Morehead. Rep.
Schroeder,O·Co.) and 141 CONG REc. 5193 12 (Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy
D·Vt.).

103. Pub. L. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985.

10 1. See 141

COKO. R£c. H 14317 and 141 CONGo REc. S19312.

104. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, 104'" Cong., I'" Sess. 2 (Nov. 30, 1995).
102. The amendment to the Lanham Act which constitutes the FTDA is u follows:
Section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1125) is amended by adding
at thr: end the following new subsection: Remedies for Dilution of Famous Marks
(c) (1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled to the principles of equiry
and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against
anothe r person's conunercial use in conunerce of a mark or trade name, if such
use begins after the make has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is pro..ided in
this subsection. In detennining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a COW1
may consider factol'$ such as. but no t limited to--{a) the degree of inherent or
acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (b) the duration and extent of the use ofw
mark in connection "'ith the goods or services "'ith which the mark is used; (c)
the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (d) the
geographical elCten,t of the trading area in which the mark is used; (e) the channels
of tradr: for the goods or services with which the oVo'T\er's mark is used; (f) the
degree of ret:ognition of the mark in trading areas and channels of trade used by
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